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A B S T R A C T
With the process of digitalization now in full swing, many are wondering how the adoption of new technologies
influences job creation and destruction. Much hinges upon the specific tasks that machines take on and how
many new tasks are created through the adoption of new digital technologies. Some argue that most tasks that
are at risk of automation are those performed by rather low- to medium-skilled employees, while most new tasks
that emerge from the adoption of digital technologies complement high-skilled labor. We present evidence
derived from representative survey data from Switzerland that is consistent with this view. Specifically, we find
that increased investment in digitalization is associated with increased employment of high-skilled workers and
reduced employment of low-skilled workers, with a slightly positive net effect. The main effects are almost
entirely driven by firms that employ machine-based digital technologies, e.g. robots, 3D printing or the Internet
of Things. We do not find any significant employment effects when non-machine-based digital technologies are
considered, e.g. ERP, e-commerce or cooperation support systems.
1. Introduction
There is widespread consensus among both academics and practi-
tioners that innovation is the main driver of productivity, economic
growth and job creation. Whether this holds true with regard to in-
novations that fall under the umbrella of ‘digitalization’ is a subject of
vigorous debate, though. This debate is particularly controversial when
it comes to the impact of digitalization on job creation and destruction.
Indeed, for more than a century, bookshelves have been filled with
analyses on how technological development influences jobs. Many
prominent academics have argued – and some still argue – that man and
machine are in a race, which machines will eventually win, leading to
mass unemployment (e.g. Leontief, 1952; Ford, 2015). Historical ex-
amples of jobs that were washed away by technological developments
seem to confirm this view, e.g. stoker that were replaced by electrical
engines. At the same time, it is not a controversial statement that many
new jobs were created in the wake of technological developments of the
past (e.g. Landes, 1969; Chandler, 1977; Mokyr, 1990). After all, con-
sistent with Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction, the net
impact on jobs seems to be positive (Mastrostefano and Pianta, 2009;
Kogan et al., 2017).1 The crucial, yet unanswered, question is whether
this time is different.
One way to think about potential job creation and destruction
conceptually is to differentiate between tasks that are regularly per-
formed by human beings but could be performed equally well or more
efficiently by machines, versus tasks that cannot be substituted by
machine work, or new complementary tasks that are created because of
machine adoption. Many politicians and employees feel challenged by
the ongoing digital revolution because the new technologies behind it
often seem to be direct substitutes for tasks that are regularly performed
by human beings. Some technologies enable far-reaching changes of
established production lines, e.g. through intelligent platform designs
that render intermediaries obsolete or shift of tasks from employees to
customers. Also, unlike many other technological developments of the
past, digitalization is a general-purpose technology, i.e. it can be
adopted across a wide range of industries, including the service sector
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2016). In a frequently cited study on tasks
that are susceptible to automation through digital technologies,
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robotics and artificial intelligence, Frey and Osborne (2017) conclude
that 47% of jobs in the U.S. are at risk of becoming redundant.2
However, these numbers are unlikely to hold true (e.g. Arntz et al.,
2017; Autor, 2015; Dengler and Matthes, 2015) and, even if they would
turn out to be true, it is by no means clear that the world would be
facing a future of prevalent mass unemployment. Coinciding with the
evolution of information and communication technologies (ICT) over
the last few decades, plenty of new tasks, such as programming and
data analysis, have been created that are still hard to automate via
machine work (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017a). These ICT-induced
technological developments, which might well be viewed as early ad-
vances of digitalization, contributed to the emergence of whole new
industries that nowadays employ millions of workers performing tasks
that formerly did not exist. Few had foreseen such developments at a
time when companies like Facebook and Amazon had not even been
founded.
Conceptually it is crucial to note two things. The tasks that become
obsolete due to digital technologies are typically of a different kind than
the tasks created, and different types of digital technologies may have
heterogeneous effects on skill requirements. Robots, for instance, ty-
pically compete quite directly with manual labor that requires a low to
medium skill level. Tasks that are created, on the other hand, typically
require a rather high skill level and are relatively few in total. Since jobs
are defined by the tasks to be fulfilled, a change in the demand for
certain tasks may simultaneously lead to the creation and destruction of
jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements. Over the last decade, for
instance, research has found an increase in jobs for high-skilled and
low-skilled workers, while jobs for medium-skilled labor were in de-
cline (e.g. Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al.,
2009; Michaels et al., 2014). This job polarization can be attributed to
technological change, but it is not clear which types of technologies
caused these employment effects and whether technologies summarized
under the umbrella of digitalization lead to similar effects.
So far, the literature has been unable to empirically link within firm
changes in investment in digitalization with within firm changes in
employment across different skill groups. The present paper aims to
address this gap in the literature in two steps. First, we will estimate
standard models of employment changes in different skill categories on
changes in investment in digitalization. In a second step, we propose
and empirically confirm a differentiation between the impact of non-
machine-based digital technologies, such as ERP, social media, or e-
commerce, and rather complex machine-based digital technologies,
such as robots, 3D printing or the Internet of Things. Technically, ma-
chine-based technologies are characterized by a powerful combination
of data access, computation and communication technologies with
acting hardware. This gives machine-based digital technologies their
disruptive power, and it is these technologies in particular that are
supposed to drive the current industrial revolution (Rifkin, 2013).
Our empirical analysis is based on representative data from two
surveys.3 We exploit firm-level information on investment in
digitalization and on the adoption of a rich list of specific digital
technologies that ranges from well-known technologies such as ERP,
customer relationship management (CRM), supply chain management
(SCM) systems, e-commerce and robots to fairly recently adopted
technologies such as social media, cloud computing, 3D printing, au-
tonomous vehicles, and the Internet of Things.
Consistent with the literature and recent advances in economic
theory (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017a), we find that investment in
digitalization is associated with increased employment of high-skilled
labor whereas low- and medium-skilled labor tends to decline or remain
unaffected. Separate examinations of firms that adopt complex ma-
chine-based digital technologies and firms that use non-machine-based
digital technologies reveal heterogeneous effects. Only machine-based
technologies driving the current industrial revolution are responsible
for significant employment effects. The estimated impact of investment
in digitalization is distinct from investment in general research and
development (R&D) and, while important limitations remain, all results
survive controls for firm fixed effects and several robustness and sen-
sitivity checks.
The investigation contributes to at least two strings of literature.
First, we complement research in economics on the impact of innova-
tion on employment growth. Most prior studies on the topic have found
positive influences of innovation on employment at the firm level (e.g.
Blanchflower and Burgess, 1999; Van Reenen, 1997; Entorf and
Pohlmeir, 1990; Smolny, 1998; Balsmeier and Delanote, 2015). Dif-
ferent types of innovation, e.g. product vs. process innovations, can
have differing impacts, though, and the net influence depends on the
chosen strategies for innovation and varies across industries
(Mastrostefano and Pianta, 2009). In the long run, the overall positive
impact holds at the industry level; even after taking complex dynamics
of the relationship into account (Mastrostefano and Pianta, 2009).
While this literature achieved quite a deep level of understanding,
empirical analyses often had to rely on rather broad measures of in-
novation, e.g. R&D expenses or innovation counts, which inhibit more
fine-grained analyses of specific technological developments in a sys-
tematic way. Our data help us to overcome this limitation by enabling
us to link within firm changes specifically in investments in digitali-
zation to within firm changes in jobs with differing skill requirements.
Related studies analyze changes in the casualization of work and work
contracts that are caused by the process of digitalization (e.g. Aubert-
Tarby et al., 2018) or provide in-depth analyses of a single technology,
e.g. 3D-printing (Rayna et al., 2015). Arntz et al. (2018), on the other
hand, estimate the net impact of digitalization on employment for the
whole German economy, using a rigorous structural model. Consistent
with our findings, they report a small positive net effect. Both their and
our result run counter to the overly negative prediction by Frey and
Osborne (2017), which has received much attention by politicians and
the popular press although it does not hold up to more rigorous ap-
proaches (Arntz et al., 2017). Apart from a contribution the scientific
literature, our study thus contributes to the public debate on how di-
gitalization influences job destruction and creation. In line with prior
literature on job polarization (e.g. Autor et al., 2003; Goos and
Manning, 2007; Oesch and Rodrıguez Menes, 2011) our study suggests
to expect heterogeneous employment effects across skill groups. It
supports former findings of increased demand for high-skilled labor and
lower demand for medium-skilled labor but differs with respect to low-
skilled labor. While former studies showed that demand for low-skilled
workers increased in response to technological changes of the past
decades, we find that firms’ investment in digitalization is associated
with a decline in firms’ low-skilled workers. Due to the restriction of our
empirical setup to a single country and rather small dataset of firms
2While the proportion of jobs at risk is even higher (57%) if all Western
economies are taken into account (Schwab, 2016) the numbers reflect only
theoretical potentials and appear to be strongly upward biased. Once taking
into account workers’ ability to adapt and switch tasks within jobs, these figures
decline strongly, see e.g. Arntz et al. (2017). Second, these figures solely reflect
theoretical technological potentials. The employment effects of these theore-
tical technological potentials are probably very different, as discussed by Autor
(2015).
3 Both surveys are based on the same representative sample of firms with at
least 20 full-time equivalent employees and were carried out by the KOF Swiss
Economic Institute in cooperation with the Chair of Work and Organizational
Psychology at the Department of Management, Technology, and Economics at
the ETH Zurich, and the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern
Switzerland, School of Applied Psychology in 2016 and by the KOF Swiss
Economic Institute in 2015. Similar data exists for Germany, and has been
(footnote continued)
analyzed with a different focus elsewhere (e.g. Arntz et al., 2018; Lehmer and
Matthes, 2017; Arntz et al., 2016).
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with at least 20 employees in 2015, it is too early to safely conclude that
digitalization will have different effects on low-skilled labor than
technological developments of the past. The present study provides an
early snapshot of a potentially important change though, which de-
serves further attention by future studies. It also points to a largely
neglected heterogeneity across technologies that is often masked by
more aggregated data.
2. Institutional background - a snapshot of the Swiss economy
Before jumping to the analysis section, it is worthwhile looking at
the institutional background of our empirical setting. Switzerland is a
technologically advanced, small and open economy. It is the most in-
novative country in Europe according to the European Innovation
Scoreboard 2017 and it is also ranked among the most competitive
countries in the world (WF Ranking, 2016–2017, Bris and Cabolis,
2017). Related to this performance, we observe a rather stable industry
structure, which is strongly exposed to international competition.
About 53% of manufacturing firms with more than five employees are
exporters, and the average sales share of exports amounted to 36% in
2014. Also, the service sector is significantly exposed to international
competition; 33% of service firms are exporters, and the average sales
share amounts to 12%. While we have observed an increase in the
economic importance of the service sector in countries like the U.S., the
Netherlands, and some Scandinavian countries, Switzerland’s manu-
facturing sector has remained a mainstay of the country’s economy; its
share in value added only slightly decreased from 28% in 1991 to 25%
in 2010 (Arvanitis et al., 2014).
The international competitiveness of the Swiss economy is partly
due to the effectiveness of the education sector. It contributes to the
high employment rate and the large proportion of well-educated
people. The total employment rate of 80% is the second highest in
Europe (Eurostat, 2016). Switzerland has a comprehensive vocational
training system that is often seen as the backbone of its manufacturing
excellence. It provides workers with specialist skills, which makes them
a highly sought-after workforce in several sectors. Overall, the Swiss
employees are well educated. The share of high-skilled employees
(tertiary degree) amounts to 29%, the share of employees with a mid-
skilled level (secondary school for general education and vocational
education) and the share of low-skilled labor (compulsory school)
amounts to 61% and 10% respectively (FSO (Federal Statistical Office),
2018a).
A high employment rate with well-educated staff has its price.
Switzerland ranks second among European countries in terms of sal-
aries per working hour. The average Swiss employee earned 62.01 CHF
(CHF 1 ≅ USD 1.02 ≅ EUR 0.90) per hour in 2012. Only Norway has
higher salaries.4 Although labor costs are very high, the labor share has
remained stable since the 1980s (Siegenthaler and Stucki, 2015).
Given its large manufacturing sector, its technological expertise and
its well-educated labor force, the Swiss economy should be very re-
ceptive to the adoption of digital technologies. Indeed, 29% of firms use
robots, 12% use 3D printing, and 10% use Internet-of-Things applica-
tions (see Appendix, Table A1 for details). Owing to the increasing in-
vestment in these and other digital technologies over the last few years,
many expect the demand for skills to change, which is an important
field of investigation and the main subject of the paper at hand.
3. Empirical investigation
3.1. Data
In order to investigate the consequences of investment in digitali-
zation for job creation and destruction we draw on two datasets.
First, we use data from a unique representative survey on the di-
gitalization activities of Swiss firms.5 The main goal of the survey was
to provide a comprehensive overview of the adoption of fairly complex
machine-based and non-machine-based digitalization technologies in
the private sector. The survey includes detailed information on the
educational attainment of firms’ employees along other firm char-
acteristics, e.g. research and development expenditures. The survey was
carried out in 2016. It followed the same professional standards (sam-
pling techniques, non-response control etc.) that are regularly used for
the well-known Community Innovation Surveys, which have been ex-
tensively studied in the past.6
Second, we use data from the Swiss Innovation Survey (SIS) 2015,
which is equivalent to the Community Innovation Survey in the EU
member states. The data proved to be reliable and robust against sta-
tistical biases in terms of ‘type of questions’ or ‘common response bias’
(Podsakoff et al., 2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2013). Although the
questionnaire includes qualitative questions, we only use quantitative
information for the study at hand. Potential imprecision in qualitative
answers or ‘subjective’ answers should thus not affect this investigation.
Both surveys are based on the KOF enterprise panel, which is a re-
presentative sample of Swiss firms, comprising 5700 firms in total. The
panel is a stratified random sample of firms with more than five em-
ployees. Stratification refers to 34 industries and within each industry
to three firm-size classes. It covers the manufacturing, construction, and
service sectors. The response rate amounted to 30% in both surveys.7
For the present study we restricted the sample to firms with at least 20
employees in 2015, because only for these firms were information
about their digital investments requested in both surveys.8 Finally, we
merged both surveys at the firm level based on the unique time-in-
variant firm identifier of the KOF enterprise panel, allowing us to as-
semble information on two points in time, 2014 and 2015, per firm.
This approach improves identification (see below) at the expense of a
loss in observations of firms with fewer than 20 employees and those
4 If we correct for purchasing power, Switzerland – with an hourly wage of
36.65 CHF – remains among the three countries with the highest compensation,
ranking third after Norway and Belgium (FSO (Federal Statistical Office),
2016).
5 The digitalization survey was conducted by the ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss
Economic Institute, the Chair of Work and Organizational Psychology at the
Department of Management, Technology, and Economics at the ETH Zurich,
and the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland
(FHNW), School of Applied Psychology (APS).
6 For more information about the survey and comprehensive descriptive
statistics, see Arvanitis et al. (2017).
7 The authors are part of the team that collected the data and have in-depth
knowledge of the questionnaires and the survey process. The response rate is
quite satisfactory, given that both surveys are not compulsory. A comprehen-
sive non-response control and targeted recalls significantly increase the survey
response rates and guarantee sufficient coverage in all cells (34 industries times
three firm-size classes). Due to item non-response we lose 145 observations. In
the first-difference setting we do not detect any item non-response for em-
ployment and R&D activities, however, there are missing values of the ex-
penditures for digital technologies.
8 The company size distribution in the population is much skewed. Like in
many other countries, very small companies are dominating. According to the
enterprise census in Switzerland (provisional data for 2016) 90% of all com-
panies have between 1 and 9 employees (full-time equivalent). 8% have be-
tween 10 and 49 employees, 1.5% have between 50 and 250 employees, and
0.3% are large companies with more than 250 employees (FSO (Federal
Statistical Office), 2018b). It is important to note however, that in total 50% of
the employees work in companies with more than 50 employees (FSO (Federal
Statistical Office), 2018c). Hence, our data covers a large share of the economic
activity in Switzerland, although it is representative only for firms with at least
20 employees.
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that responded only in one survey to all questions of interest.9 Com-
paring the descriptive statistics of the final sample with the non-merged
cross-sectional data revealed that the restriction to firms observed twice
did not cause a sample selection bias (see Tables A2a, A2b and A3 in the
Appendix).10
3.2. Measurement of educational attainment
In order to disentangle potential differences in job creation and
destruction across jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements we dif-
ferentiate between three levels of formal education. The category ‘high-
skilled’ contains workers with professional tertiary education (ISCED97
4), including graduates from universities of applied sciences (ISCED 5b)
and conventional universities (ISCED97 5a and 6). The category ‘mid-
skilled’ refers to workers with completed upper secondary education
(ISCED97 3) and workers who have finished vocational education and
training (VET) rather than a general upper secondary education. The
third category (‘low-skilled’) comprises untrained workers and dual
VET students (ISCED97 1 and 2). VET refers to upper secondary edu-
cation that prepares students for labor market entry. Dual VET refers to
upper secondary education that combines classroom education and
workplace training. These students typically work in the firm for about
three days per week and spend the remaining time in classroom edu-
cation. This education usually takes three to four years to complete.
Since these students cannot be employed like fully trained workers, we
follow the literature and combine them with untrained workers in the
category ‘low-skilled’ (Bolli et al., 2017).
The descriptive statistics show that firms created on average about
14 high-skilled jobs, while they reduced mid-skilled jobs by about four
employees and low-skilled jobs by about nine employees. In total the
average firm created two jobs in the period under investigation.
3.3. Measurement of digitalization
Our main explanatory variable is firms’ investment in digitalization.
For the study at hand we look at changes in investment between 2014
and 2015. The descriptive statistics show that the average firm spent
about CHF 620,000 (CHF 1 ≅ USD 1.02 ≅ EUR 0.90) on digitalization
and increased their digital investment from 2014 to 2015 by around
CHF 84,000, i.e. 13.5%. The average firm is of medium size, has 273
employees, and invests about CHF 1.138 million in R&D (Table 1 pro-
vides further descriptive statistics in levels of 2015. Table A3 in the
Appendix shows descriptive statistics of the differenced variables and
corresponding correlations are presented in Table A4).
In order to get a grasp of the heterogeneous influence of different
digital technologies on job creation and destruction we differentiate
between the adoption of fairly complex machine-based digital tech-
nologies, which are supposed to drive the current industrial revolution,
and other non-machine-based technologies, which are regularly
adopted by a wide range of firms across all industries. It is assumed that
the complexity and challenges of digital technologies and also their
consequences for employment differ between both categories. This has
much to do with the complexity of their adoption, but also especially
with their disruptive power and the tasks that are regularly performed
by machine-based technologies in contrast to the tasks that are reg-
ularly performed by non-machine-based digital technologies. We con-
sider the following technologies to be complex machine-based: com-
puterized automated control systems, programmable logistic
controllers, rapid prototyping, computerized numerical control (CNC)
and direct numerical control (DNC) machines, robots, autonomous
vehicles, 3D printing, and the Internet of Things. Technically, the cru-
cial difference between these and non-machine-based technologies is
their powerful combination of data access, computation and commu-
nication technologies with acting hardware. This often gives machine-
based digital technologies their disruptive power, and it is these tech-
nologies in particular that are supposed to drive the current industrial
revolution. Given the technical complexity of machine-based digitali-
zation, their implementation is often capital intensive, requires high-
skilled labor, and is only profitable if it allows firms to produce at much
lower cost per unit or higher quality standards than otherwise possible.
Here lies another crucial difference compared to non-machine-based
technologies that might sometimes be adopted with the same intentions
but are in fact often ‘just’ used to facilitate extant single processes rather
than to disrupt or significantly change the whole production process.
Consider, for instance, ERP, social media or e-purchasing. For most
firms, these technologies are rather easy to adopt and complement
extant processes instead of substituting them. They typically do not
change the core production process or set new industry standards of
product production.
Finally, we argue that especially machine-based digital technologies
can be seen as powerful tools that enable workers to raise their pro-
ductivity as long as they are qualified and skilled enough to bring them
to a fruitful usage. High skilled workers will not only more likely use
these technologies as complements, but will also more likely develop
new unforeseen solutions, while low-skilled workers are more likely to
lack the technical know-how required to use these technologies as
fruitfully. Further, the latter group of workers has a natural interest not
to propose any change where machine-based technologies substitute for
tasks regularly fulfilled by low skilled workers even if it would en-
counter it. Together with the higher complexity of machine-based as
opposed to non-machine based digital technologies the relevance of
advanced skills increases while medium to low skill levels face lower
demand, leading in turn to heterogeneous impacts on job creation and
destruction across skill levels. Although this differentiation is not
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable count mean median sd min max
Investment in
digitalization
447 6.20 0.68 57.82 0.00 1,204.50
Total employees 447 272.80 98.00 1,057.28 20.00 18,965.00
High-skilled emp. 447 36.70 7.84 238.62 0.00 4,930.90
Mid-skilled emp. 447 46.45 13.30 130.90 0.00 1,455.52
Low-skilled emp. 447 175.55 51.20 763.18 0.00 12,896.20
R&D investment 447 11.38 0.00 52.08 0.00 763.02
Machine-based tech. 447 0.62 na na 0.00 1.00
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics on all variables used in this
study, reference year 2015. Investment in digitalization and R&D investment
are measured in CHF 100,000 (CHF 1 USD 1.02 EUR 0.90). Machine-based
tech. indicates firms that employ at least one of the following technologies:
Computerized automated control systems, programmable logical controllers,
rapid prototyping, CNC/DNC machines, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing,
radio-frequency identification (RFID), or the Internet of Things. High (mid,
low)-skilled is the number of employees with a high (medium, or low) level of
educational attainment, as described in detail above. Total employment is total
amount of full time equivalent employment. Data source: KOF Swiss Economic
Institute at ETH Zurich. The descriptive statistics for the single cross-sections
are presented in the Appendix Table A2a and Table A2b. There are a few firms
with less than 20 employees in 2014 (see Table A2b). If we drop these ob-
servations, the main results do not change.
9 See Appendix A12 for a complete list of questions used in this study.
10 Switzerland shows a low amount of firm foundations and closures per year.
The latest available figures show that there were 694 closures in 2014 and 845
in 2013 in total; and there were about 700 to 900 firm foundations with more
than 5 employees in the same years. The annual closure rate of firms with at
least 10 employees was 0.3%. Given these very low numbers in the complete
Swiss economy, we would expect to find 1-2 firm closures in our sample, if we
could observe them. Although, we cannot rule out that these could have a
significant impact on the results, the likelihood seems rather low. Since newly
founded firms are not included in our sample, the results are at least not directly
influenced by newly founded firms.
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always applicable and contradictory examples exist, we believe it is an
important distinction within digital technologies and their various
possible impacts on job creation and destruction.
Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of digital technologies
used by the Swiss firms in our sample. Non-machine-based technologies
like ERP, e-purchasing, and CRM are used by 79%, 61%, and 51% of the
sample firms, respectively. The diffusion rates are significantly higher
in large firms than in medium-sized and small (SME) ones. A note-
worthy aspect is that many firms are combining different types of di-
gital technologies – for instance, the use of ERP to improve resource
planning, and CRM to support customer relationships with specialized
information. They might also allow employees to access the technolo-
gical infrastructure of the firm via remote access (telework) and share
information within the firm using cloud services.11 In our analyses
below we separately examine firms that have adopted at least one
machine-based digital technology and those that only use at least one
non-machine-based technology.12 62% of the firms in our sample had
used at least one machine-based technology by 2016, while 38% had
only used non-machine-based technologies (Table A1 in the Appendix).
High-tech manufacturing industries such as machinery, electronic and
optical instruments, and vehicles show slightly higher penetration rates
of machine-based technologies than low-tech manufacturing industries
such as food/beverages/tobacco and basic metals (see Table A2 in the
Appendix for details). There is no firm in the sample that uses no di-
gitalization technology at all. This might be a typical outcome when
firms have at least 20 employees and labor costs are high, which en-
courages firms across all sectors to automate their production processes.
Generally, we observe a positive correlation between firm size and the
rate of adoption of digital technologies.
3.4. Methodological remarks
The standard approach to investigate if investment in digital tech-
nologies increases or reduces the creation of jobs would be a classic
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of employment on investment
in digitalization. The main issue with this approach is that we can
hardly control for all kinds of firm characteristics that may simulta-
neously influence the creation of jobs and investment in digitalization,
e.g., firms’ strategy or managerial quality. A straightforward commonly
used improvement over the classic OLS framework is the usage of panel
estimators, where one can include firm-specific indicators that control
for potential omitted variable biases from unobserved time-invariant
firm characteristics. All those estimators require a strong panel com-
ponent, though, i.e. information on firms observed over a long time
span. In the absence of such a panel, but with information on two points
in time, we can effectively control for unobserved time-invariant firm
characteristics by estimating the standard model in differences. Hence,
we regress the difference of the total number of employees (in a certain
skill category) in the second period minus the total number of em-
ployees (in a certain skill category) in the first period on the corre-
sponding difference in investment in digitalization. It is easy to show
that this strategy is immune to any time-invariant omitted variable bias
like the regular firm fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). For-
mally, we estimate the following equation:
Skill rnd empdiginvest_chfi i i i i0 1 2 3= + + + + (1)
where
Skill highskill midskill lowskill{ , , }
and i is the firm index. We explicitly control for the change in R&D
expenses along the change in investment in digitalization as the former
may well coincide and have similar effects on job creation and de-
struction. We also control for the total change in jobs to prevent our
coefficient of interest 1 from capturing general firm-size changes.
Owing to the estimation in differences we implicitly control for firm age
and unobserved heterogeneity across industries.13 The results do not
change when we control for the initial level of employment instead of
the absolute change. We also find consistent results, if we use the share
of workers in a given category instead of the absolute change (see
Appendix, Table A5). For U.S. firms, it has been argued that imports
and exports may still confound the estimation because changes in that
regard might trigger investment in digitalization and employment
changes alike. Fortunately, we can control for both of these factors but
only for a smaller group of firms. We thus show these results as part of
other sensitivity checks in the Appendix, Tables A6 and A7. Since all
results presented below remained qualitatively unchanged after the
inclusion of these controls, and other controls like foreign ownership
and technology age (see Table A8a), we focus in our main analyses on
the short model (results on all the extended models are available from
the authors upon request). In alternative regressions we excluded emp
from our framework, or exchanged it with firm sales as a measure of
firm size, and find similar results (see Appendix, Table A10a and Table
A10b).
4. Results
Table 2 presents the main results. We find broad support for het-
erogeneous effects of changes in investment in digitalization on changes
in employment of workers with different skills measured by their
educational attainments. Specifically, we estimate a statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.01) increase in high-skilled employment and a statis-
tically significant decrease in medium- to low-skilled jobs per CHF in-
vested in digitalization. The magnitudes of the estimated effects are
economically meaningful. Column 1, Table 2, suggests that a CHF
100,000 increase in investment in digitalization is associated with
about 5.8 more jobs for highly educated workers, four fewer jobs for
mid-skilled workers (Column 2) and about 2.3 fewer jobs for the low-
skilled (Column 3). In total, Column 4 suggests an increase of 1.6 jobs
11 Technological complexity likely increases with the use of different types of
technologies. Problems with interfaces, difficulties in programming/adapting
standard software to the specific technological infrastructure of a firm, or
training employees to efficiently use new software is likely to increase the
technological complexity within a firm and might require new skills. In un-
reported analyses, we tried to measure technological complexity with the
number of digital technologies used by a firm. We found that the average firm
in our sample uses seven different digital technologies and that most firms that
use machine-based technologies also use others. We do not differentiate be-
tween machine-based firms that use no non-machine-based digital technology
and those firms that use only machine-based technologies, because both groups
of firms do not show significant differences in terms of job creation and de-
struction. This is consistent with the finding that investments in digitalization
by firms without machine-based digital technologies show no significant re-
lationship with job creation and destruction. Results are available from the
authors upon request.
12 All results presented below are robust to excluding any single technology
while keeping the others. Information on the amount of capital invested in
specific digital technologies is unfortunately not available.
13 A classical labor demand function also envisages controls for labor costs
and capital costs. Since we use first differences in our estimations, we can drop
such controls for the following reasons. First, we look at a very short time
period (2014 and 2015) with very stable economic conditions in Switzerland.
There have been no changes in capital costs; the relevant interest rate (mean
level of mortgages) changed by only 0.03%-points (from 2.69% to 2.66%) be-
tween January 2014 and December 2015 (see Swiss National Bank, 2017). Also,
labor costs hardly changed, increasing by 0.4% between 2014 and 2015 (see
FSO (Federal Statistical Office), 2017). Second, since capital costs do not vary
much among industries, we address them with our first-difference approach.
Wage data might cause serious endogeneity problems in single-equation set-
tings; hence, some authors even propose omitting wage data (see e.g. Machin
and Van Reenen, 1998; Arvanitis and Loukis, 2015).
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per CHF 100,000 invested in digitalization. The difference between this
estimate and the total of the estimates from models 1 to 3 is due to the
fact that we control for the total size increase in models 1 to 3.14 It
suggests digitalization has a small net positive impact on employment
in Switzerland at least in the short run, which is consistent with recent
findings derived from a structural model based on German data (Arntz
et al., 2018).
Depending on the specific situation and technology employed, the
employment effects likely reflect the need for new personnel to install
and implement the acquired assets, change the production process, or
to bring new services and products to the market. As individuals who
work on these tasks typically need to be trained in advance, the hiring
of new workers may start before the actual adoption of the digital
technologies, resulting in a rather quick response of employment fig-
ures to investments in digitalization. The decline in low and medium
skilled employment is unlikely to reflect dismissals due to the strong
employment protection in Switzerland. Negatively affected employees,
however, will either learn about negative career prospects or will be
informed in advance of the actual investment. Those workers may thus
search for new jobs with better career prospects rather quickly, such
that negative employment effects materialize within a short time frame
and despite strong institutional job protection.
If we separately consider firms that employ at least one machine-
based digital technology (Table 3, Columns 1–3) and the other firms
(Table 3, Columns 4–6), we find that our main results are entirely
driven by the group of firms that employ at least one machine-based
technology.15 The impact of digital investment on high-skilled em-
ployees is not only insignificant for firms without machine-based digital
technologies but also statistically significantly different from the coef-
ficient derived for firms that adopted at least one machine-based digital
technology (two-sided t-test, p < 0.003). This suggests that different
types of digital technologies do indeed exert different impacts on em-
ployment. The coefficients in the mid-skilled employee regressions
(models 2 and 5) are insignificantly different though (p=0.264), and
the coefficients in the low-skilled employee regressions (models 3 and
6) only pass the one-sided test (p= 0.071).16 This result is broadly
consistent with recent findings from the U.S., where the impact of the
adoption of robots has been analyzed (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017b),
but it differs in terms of the net impact our results imply.17
These results fit the view that the strongest impact of digital tech-
nologies on job creation and destruction materializes where machines
are empowered by data access, computation and communication
technologies. This is also the area where technological advances have
been the most dynamic over the last few years, and this is supposed to
be the main driver of the current industrial revolution. The fact that we
do not find significant employment effects for firms that have adopted
only non-machine-based technologies may not be surprising, given that
previous studies have found that ICT investment does not have major
impacts on either employment or productivity (e.g. Acemoglu et al.,
2014; Chen and Xie, 2015).18
The change in total employment is significant positively associated
with an increase in high- and low-skilled labor, suggesting that most of
the general hiring of employees happens in these categories.
4.1. IV regression
While we effectively control for unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity plus the main suspects of time-variant covariates in our pre-
vious models, some unobserved time-varying factors might still con-
found the estimation. Potential candidates are unobserved changes in
firm strategies, e.g. changing to a more open innovation strategy that
enlarges the collaboration network. This might increase high-skilled
jobs and reduce lower-skilled jobs and trigger additional investment in
digital technologies to improve communication within the extended
network. If such changes were common, the previously estimated po-
sitive effect of investment in digitalization on high-skilled job creation
and the negative effect on low-skilled jobs would be overestimated.
To address these concerns we turn to instrumental variable regres-
sions. In order to derive consistent estimates from an IV regression, our
instrument needs to fulfill the validity requirements, i.e. it needs to
explain the change in investment in digitalization while being un-
correlated with changes in the number of jobs created in different skill
categories. In the present empirical setting we exploit the fact that the
main ICT network provider in Switzerland was in the middle of its
expansion of the high-speed broadband network right before the sample
starts. We considered an internet connection to be high speed if it was
based on fiber-to-the-home technology, vectoring technology, or al-
lowed download speeds of more than 100 Mbit/s. We obtained data on
the regional expansion of the Swisscom19 fiber and vector network for
2014, which by then covered about 60% of the firms in our sample.
Since it is the predominant – but not the only – way to get a fast internet
connection in Switzerland, we supplemented it with survey data on
whether firms would actually have access to high-speed internet even
Table 2
Investment in digitalization and job creation and destruction.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables High-skilled Mid-skilled Low-skilled Total
employees
Investment in
digitalization
5.841*** −4.001** −2.307*** 1.597***
(1.812) (1.902) (0.399) (0.401)
Investment in R&
D
0.033 −0.033 0.001 0.003
(0.024) (0.028) (0.006) (0.032)
Total employees 0.274** 0.032 0.660***
(0.129) (0.121) (0.101)
Observations 447 447 447 447
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.689 0.348 0.398 0.117
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. All variables are measured in ab-
solute differences between 2015 and 2014. High (mid, low)-skilled is the ab-
solute change in employees with a high (medium, or low) level of educational
attainment, as described in detail above. Investment in digitalization is the
absolute change in investment in digitalization, measured in CHF 100,000.
Investment in R&D is the absolute change in investment in R&D, also measured
in CHF 100,000. Total employment is the change in total employment.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Data
source: ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute.
14 In alternative unreported regressions we used the share of skilled,
medium-, and low skilled labor as alternative dependent variables. The size of
the differences in shares resembles the estimated change in absolute employ-
ment for the average firm but have a weaker statistical significance, see Table
A5 in the Appendix.
15 The fully interacted model is presented in the Appendix, Table A9.
16 The two-sided test reveals a p-value of 0.1423.
17 Since we take into account not only robots but also other applications like
the Internet of Things, it may not be surprising that the results differ somewhat.
All results presented in Table 3 are even more pronounced in terms of statistical
significance if we only consider firms that use robots among those that have
adopted a machine-based digital technology. We also note differences in the
institutional environments of both settings, which might play an important role
too (see also the discussion below).
18 Arvanitis and Loukis (2009) found small positive effects of ICT investment
on the productivity of Swiss firms in 2004 but did not consider employment
effects. They did not control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity ei-
ther, which might have revealed different findings.
19 Swisscom is the incumbent in the Swiss telecommunications market and
the dominant provider of fixed-line telecommunications infrastructure. Sunrise
and Cablecom are the main, albeit significantly smaller, competitors.
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without Swisscom network coverage. Based on this information, we
defined our instrument as being a dummy that has a value of one if a
firm is covered by the Swisscom network or has another type of high-
speed internet access, and is zero otherwise.
We would argue that a fast internet connection should have trig-
gered investment in digitalization because most digital technologies
require such infrastructure in order to be implemented and used ef-
fectively. Indeed, we find this view supported by the first stage of our IV
regression (see Table A11 in the Appendix). The instrument is in-
dividually significant, but the strength is lower than expected. The F-
test on individual instrument strength reveals a value of 3.02 (3.83 in
the sub-sample of machine-based digital technology adopters), while it
is generally recommended to have a strength of ten or more to be on the
safe side (Stock and Yogo, 2005). The rather weak instrument calls for a
very cautious interpretation because IV regressions can be even more
biased than OLS regressions in such cases (see Young, 2018, for an
extend discussion of weak instrument biases and violation of the ex-
clusion restriction). Since we also have only one instrument, we cannot
formally test the exclusion restriction, i.e. whether the instrument is
indeed uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage. The fact
that it is not directly related to our depended variable, or other firm
characteristics, suggests that it may still work. We acknowledge that it
is not perfect, and it could be correlated with some unobserved regional
characteristics that are in turn correlated with firms’ investment in di-
gitalization and/or job creation. One noteworthy aspect is that such
correlations may formally violate the exclusion restriction but do not
necessarily cause huge biases (Conley et al., 2012). Overall, a very
careful assessment of the IV results is warranted although our results
based on the previously estimated models generally hold up in this
setup, as Table 4 shows. The coefficients are in all models of high- to
low-skilled jobs similar to those estimated previously. The statistical
significance drops quite a bit in the full sample (models 1 to 3), where
only the positive impact of investment in digitalization on high-skilled
jobs remains significant at conventional levels. In the sub-sample of
firms that have adopted machine-based digital technologies we still find
the impact to be statistically significant (p < 0.05) on high- as well as
low-skilled employment.20 That the statistical significance drops quite a
bit compared to the OLS results is not surprising because of the two step
procedure, which makes estimates less precise compared to OLS, all else
equal. The magnitudes of the coefficients estimated with OLS and IV are
statistical insignificant, although the sizes of the coefficients nominally
differ quite a bit with respect to medium and low-skilled labor. Under
the assumption that our IV estimates are not biased, the nominally
lower effect of investment in digitalization on medium skilled labor
might be the result of unobserved training programs that are offered to
medium skilled employees at the same time when changes caused by
the adoption of digital technologies apply. The seemingly under-
estimated effect of changes in low-skilled labor in the OLS case might
stem from unobserved severance payment offers to this group of
workers, potentially because it is harder to retrain low-skilled workers
than medium skilled works to fulfill new tasks created in the wake of
the digital transformation.
Overall, our results suggest that investment in digitalization does
indeed have a significant impact on job creation and destruction. The
impact is, however, heterogeneous across skill levels and technologies –
something that has received little attention in the literature so far.
4.2. Limitations and discussion
Although we carried out an extensive set of robustness and sensi-
tivity checks, some limitations that warrant attention remain, partly
because they give rise to fruitful future research venues. First of all,
while we link investment in digitalization to employment across dif-
ferent skill levels within firms, unfortunately we cannot observe how
much has been invested in specific digital technologies and when those
technologies were actually adopted. Appendix Tables A8b to A8d ac-
tually show that our findings are more pronounced the more technol-
ogies are used for more than two years, indicating that the long term-
effects might be stronger than the short-term effects and that tech-
nology age might be a crucial factor driving our results. Further, as our
results suggest that differentiation among digital technologies is crucial,
we would not be surprised to see heterogeneous effects even within the
machine-based technologies and different kinds of non-machine-based
technologies. Heterogeneity in employment effects may also result from
the fact that technologies are applied for different purposes, at different
stages of the production process, and at different stages of their ma-
turity. For a deeper understanding it would thus be invaluable to ex-
amine where and how exactly each digitalization technology is applied.
We conjecture that the mechanisms through which each technology
Table 3
Investment in digitalization - machine-based versus non-machine-based.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Machine-based Non-machine-based
Variables High-skilled Mid-skilled Low-skilled High-skilled Mid-skilled Low-skilled
Investment in digitalization 6.247*** −4.046** −2.728*** 0.147 −1.178 1.048
(1.581) (1.840) (0.377) (0.174) (1.307) (1.327)
Investment in R&D 0.032 −0.034 0.002 0.226 0.238 −0.530
(0.022) (0.024) (0.005) (0.299) (1.077) (1.235)
Total employees 0.368** −0.124 0.734*** −0.102 0.585*** 0.458***
(0.167) (0.149) (0.111) (0.093) (0.063) (0.133)
Observations 277 277 277 170 170 170
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.762 0.458 0.601 0.165 0.189 0.136
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. All variables are measured in absolute differences between 2015 and 2014. Firms are considered to be using machine-
based digitalization technologies if they employ at least one of the following technologies: Computerized automated control systems, programmable logical con-
trollers, rapid prototyping, CNC/DNC machines, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, radio-frequency identification (RFID), or the Internet of Things. Firms are
considered to be merely using non-machine-based digitalization technologies if they do not employ any of the former machine-based technologies but use at least one
of the following technologies: ERP, CRM, SCM systems, collaboration support systems, social media, e-commerce, or telework. High (mid, low)-skilled is the absolute
change in employees with a high (medium, or low) level of educational attainment, as described in detail above. Investment in digitalization is the absolute change in
investment in digitalization, measured in CHF 100,000. Investment in R&D is the absolute change in investment in R&D, also measured in CHF 100,000. Total
employment is the change in total employment. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Data source: ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute.
20 Similar to the standard OLS results presented above we do not find any
significant effects in the sub-sample of firms that do not use any machine-based
digital technology. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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contributes to job creation and destruction will be quite heterogeneous.
As such, industry-, technology- or even firm-specific analyses that focus
on one specific technology such as robots or autonomous cars would
appear to be fruitful avenues for future research. When such research is
carried out, attention should also be given to measuring the market
impact of digital technologies.
Second, we need to keep in mind that our sample covers a specific
time period when the business cycle was in an upswing and digital
technologies were considered to be much more disruptive than during
previous years. Recent advances in economic theory suggest that the
observed spread in demand for high-skilled and low-skilled employees
is part of the digitalization process and is expected to be most pro-
nounced in the middle of the transition phase from a non-digitalized
economy to a fully digitalized one (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017a).
This means that our estimates may change over the course of the next
few years towards a more mature technological environment. The
sample is further limited by its restriction to firms with at least 20
employees. The relationship between investment in digitalization and
job creation might thus look different for very small firms in general
and the increasingly popular entrepreneurial firms in specific. It should
also be mentioned again that our IV regression is far from perfect, such
that a very careful interpretation is warranted. There might still be
unobserved time-varying factors that are correlated with investment in
digitalization and employment in different skill groups, which might
cause our estimates to be biased up- or downwards, respectively. Po-
tential candidates are changes to a more open innovation strategy that
enlarges the collaboration network. This might increase high-skilled
jobs and reduce lower-skilled jobs and trigger additional investment in
digital technologies to improve communication within the extended
network. If such changes were common, the previously estimated po-
sitive effect of investment in digitalization on high-skilled job creation
and the negative effect on low-skilled jobs would be overestimated.
Third, vocational (dual) education is an important part of the Swiss
education system, and officials quite frequently assume that it accounts
for the country’s low unemployment rates. The presented results and
other empirical evidence suggest that the digitalization process reduces
employment not only for low-skilled workers but also, at least to a
lesser extent, for mid-skilled employees as well (Siegenthaler and
Stucki, 2015). Given that the private sector is strongly involved in the
design of courses, ensuring great flexibility and practical relevance for
training, the digital challenges might be beyond the system’s capacity to
adapt (Renold et al., 2016). It may require a redesign of the vocational
education system to prevent further employment losses, especially if it
turns out that the observed reduction is not temporary.
Fourth, it should be emphasized that our empirical setting refers to a
highly developed country that is often considered to be among the
technological leaders in the world, while also having one of the best-
educated workforces with quite a unique educational system. The latter
in particular should give us pause for thought when extrapolating the
presented results to other countries of the world. Because of the high
wages and liberal migration policy it should be easier for Swiss firms to
hire highly educated workers than for many firms situated outside
Switzerland. The expected returns to firms’ investment in digitalization
may thus be much higher than at other places in the world.
Furthermore, the specific institutional background may cause Swiss
firms to invest in different kinds of digital technologies and with dif-
ferent aims than firms in other countries. Given the high salaries in the
low-skilled sector, for instance, investment in automation may generate
larger pay-offs than in countries with relatively cheap labor.
Although we have no systemic evidence, it appears that the current
rise of digital technologies may exert similar effects on job creation and
destruction as previous technological disruptions. It is striking that,
consistent with our results, most modern jobs require a higher skill level
than many jobs of the past, especially those commonly found before the
second industrial revolution. One of the reasons why the second in-
dustrial revolution did not cause mass unemployment in the long run
(contrary to prominent assessments of the time) may be that the ca-
pacities of the educational sector increased accordingly, ensuring that
the new demand for high-skilled labor is met. There might be reasons to
believe this time could be dramatically different21, but the slightly
positive net effect that we have identified in the present paper might
well be taken as a reason to feel less pessimistic about the changes to
come. We acknowledge, though, that it is in fact not possible to em-
pirically identify the true net effect without a structural model.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
The emerging digitalization of the economy is expected to have a
tremendous impact on several economic parameters, particularly on the
Table 4
IV regressions – full sample and machine-based digital technology adopters only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Machine-based
Variables High-skilled Mid-skilled Low-skilled High-skilled Mid-skilled Low-skilled
Investment in digitalization (est.) 6.539** −4.184 −2.587 6.449*** −2.525 −4.269**
(2.550) (3.406) (2.628) (2.398) (3.119) (1.987)
Investment in R&D 0.032 −0.033 0.001 0.032 −0.035** 0.003
(0.027) (0.028) (0.006) (0.023) (0.018) (0.008)
Total employees 0.224 0.046 0.681*** 0.350 −0.257 0.868***
(0.168) (0.240) (0.199) (0.214) (0.272) (0.150)
Observations 447 447 447 277 277 277
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.682 0.347 0.395 0.762 0.409 0.490
Notes: The table presents results of IV regressions. The first stage is an OLS regression of Δinvestment in digitalization on a dummy indicating whether the firm had
access to high-speed internet, and zero otherwise. The F-value of individual instrument strength is 3.02 in models 1–3 and 3.83 in models 4–6. All other variables are
measured in absolute differences between 2015 and 2014. Firms are considered to be using machine-based digitalization technologies if they employ at least one of
the following technologies: Computerized automated control systems, programmable logical controllers, rapid prototyping, CNC/DNC machines, autonomous ve-
hicles, 3D printing, RFID, or the Internet of Things. High (mid, low)-skilled is the absolute change in employees with a high (medium, or low) level of educational
attainment, as described in detail above. Investment in digitalization is the estimated absolute change in investment in digitalization, measured in CHF 100,000.
Investment in R&D is the absolute change in investment in R&D, also measured in CHF 100,000. Total employment is the change in total employment.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Data source:
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute.
21 One could argue that this time is dramatically different because machines
pose a challenge for intelligent work rather than mainly manual labor as in the
past.
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number of jobs and the skills required to perform those jobs. The pre-
sent paper has addressed this topic with econometric analyses based on
unique firm-level microdata from Switzerland, one of the technological
leaders of the world. We found robust evidence on the relationship
between changes in investment in digital technologies within the firm
and employment changes within the firm, explicitly considering het-
erogeneity in terms of different skill levels and different types of digital
technologies.
Specifically, we found that investment in digital technologies is
positively associated with employment of high-skilled workers and
negatively associated with employment of low-skilled workers, with an
overall positive net effect on employment. These effects are entirely
driven by machine-based digital technologies (robots, 3D printing, the
Internet of Things) that are supposed to fuel the current industrial re-
volution. We find no significant impact of investment in digitalization
when only firms that adopt non-machine-based digital technologies,
such as ERP, e-commerce or cooperation support systems, are con-
sidered.
This evidence improves our understanding of the potential eco-
nomic implications of the digitalization process, where digital tech-
nologies are constantly changing methods of production and constantly
generating new products and services. The breakthrough of machine-
based digital technologies required better technological infrastructure
(faster internet connections, ubiquity of internet access, cloud tech-
nologies, etc.), the skills to develop such technologies, and sufficiently
skilled workers to use them effectively. Meeting these requirements
over recent years has accelerated the transformation of the economy
into the digital age. This transformation process does not come without
frictions, though. While our estimations imply that total employment
will slightly grow in the current transition period, the average masks an
increase in employment of skilled labor and a decrease in employment
of unskilled labor. The result runs counter to the unconditional state-
ment that workers are in a race against machines – at least in the short
run and for technologically advanced, open economies with a large
share of high-skilled labor, like Switzerland. This has implications for
corporate as well as political leaders.
The global war for talent is likely to intensify further. Companies
should therefore prepare to spend more time and resources on re-
cruiting and retaining skilled employees. In times of high demand and
an increasingly mobile workforce, even well-situated companies might
face strong competition for their most talented employees in the future.
Many firms in Switzerland, a country with one of the highest propor-
tions of well-educated people, argue already that a shortage of highly
qualified workers would limit their growth.
In combination with a decrease of jobs for low-skilled workers, in-
equality within the population is likely to increase. From an economic
perspective, it is thus crucial to develop and apply instruments that
minimize potential negative impacts while nurturing positive effects. As
long as medium- and low-skilled workers can be trained to learn new
skills that enable them to take over new tasks created in the wake of the
digitalization process, the promotion of such professional training
programs could be very helpful for the affected individuals and the
economy alike. Professional training and educational attainment pro-
grams should not be seen as an all-purpose medicine, however, since
physical or mental limitations may constrain their effective usage. In
such cases different instruments need to be provided, and digital
technologies themselves might actually offer a solution. Collaborative
artificial intelligences, for instance, might enable medium and low-
skilled workers to focus on tasks where they have a comparative ad-
vantage over machines, e.g. any work that requires personal emotional
interaction, while machines substitute for personal weakness, e.g. in
predicting prices and recognizing patterns. This would increase the
individual productivity of medium and low-skilled workers, which
should in turn create new job opportunities. If such efforts fail, in-
equality among workers is likely to rise, which poses a great challenge
for public institutions and policymakers.
There are three main objectives that policymakers could pursue to
address these challenges. First, it is of utmost importance for the
competitiveness of a technologically advanced country to ensure that
skilled labor is efficiently allocated to growing, productive sectors. This
implies flexible labor markets and workable product market competi-
tion to provide incentives to invest in innovation and the adoption of
new technologies. For small countries in particular it is important that
the worldwide free movement of talent is guaranteed and the hiring
process is accompanied by low administrative costs. Second, training
and continuing professional development is necessary to improve the
match between skills and job requirements. This includes training not
only in technical skills but also soft skills and emotional skills to
manage the digital transition of labor markets. Since the ability to learn
and retrain skills is positively correlated with educational attainment,
governments should increase the attractiveness of tertiary education.
Third, some parts of society might not be able (or willing) to success-
fully manage the transition to a digital age. This could be addressed by
the development of collaborative artificial intelligences as mentioned
above or innovative social measures such as an unconditional basic
income.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the
online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2019.03.010.
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